HYPOLEPSIS is ‘value judgement’. It is the ‘taking up of a conception’, a notion, an understanding. Epiktetos (Epictetus) sees a progression from preconception (<prolepsis>) through conception (<hypolepsis>) up to our more firmly convictions (<katalepsis>).
In Aristoteles (Aristotle) there is a wide use of the word <hypolepsis>. Indeed one of the theories about Aristoteles’ employment of this term affirms that it is a major concept in his epistemology. In particular, Jessica Moss (NYU) and Whitney Schwab (UMBC) both maintains that <hypolepsis> corresponds very closely to modern ‘belief’. Moreover, Moss and Schwab support the idea that <hypolepsis> is the genus of other cognitive attitudes. Also, they say that it plays this role because it is the attitude of taking-to-be-true as such. In fact, in Aristoteles’ De Anima 427b24–26 we read “there are differentiae of <hypolepsis> itself. Firstly knowledge (<epistêmê>), secondly opinion (<doxa>), thirdly practical wisdom (<phronêsis>), and the opposites of these“.
By sustaining that knowledge, opinion, and practical wisdom are all variants of <hypolepsis> Aristoteles says that they are species of the genus <hypolepsis>. Consequently, the opposites of knowledge and practical wisdom are false views about things in their domain. It is less clear what the opposite of <doxa> might be. Nevertheless, the simple point that Aristoteles here thinks of <hypolepsis> as a genus of other cognitive states is quite clear.
In conclusion, <hypolepsis> is ‘value judgement’ but interpretations, details and implications of this word are many. This is quite often the case with ancient words whose clues for us to draw a precise translation are sparse. Furthermore, philosophy is itself always looking for new terms and new meanings because exploring new topics and news horizons. Therefore, we must stay flexible and open when handling complex notions and terms. Meanings, nuances and specifities might vary in a significant way among all the thinkers.